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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the significant role of Turkey in cooperation between NATO 
and the European Union (EU). It first examines Turkish-EU relations in the period 1991-
1999, when the EU relied on the Western European Union (WEU) as its instrument for 
security and defense matters. The years 1995-1999 were especially fruitful, because 
Turkey was an associate member of the WEU and participated fully in the relevant EU 
decision-making. After the emergence of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) in 1998-1999, most WEU institutions were transferred to the EU, and Turkey’s 
status in the WEU became irrelevant. The EU sought ready access to NATO assets and 
capabilities for EU-led ESDP operations. However, Turkey as a NATO member opposed 
granting this access in order to protect its national security interests until agreement could 
be reached on the “Berlin Plus” arrangements. Turkey has also upheld the NATO-EU 
agreement on information security. That is, classified NATO information cannot be 
shared with states that are not members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace and that have 
not concluded security agreements with NATO in that framework, such as Cyprus and 
Malta. Turkey’s principled policies have thus significantly affected cooperation between 
the EU and NATO.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to advance understanding of Turkey’s role in NATO-
European Union cooperation and to evaluate the prospects of Turkey and the European 
Union resolving current disagreements. The key research questions are the following: 
How have Turkey’s policies affected cooperation between NATO and the European 
Union? How have the EU’s ESDP decisions affected Turkey’s security interests and 
NATO-EU cooperation?  
In the post-Cold War era, events such as conflicts in the Balkans and terrorist 
attacks changed threat perceptions in NATO and the European Union. In order to shape 
the security environment and defend their interests, they sought new arrangements and 
began to transform their organizational structures. The NATO Allies chose to transform 
the alliance into one dedicated to protecting “shared values and common strategic 
interests.”1 Since 1999, the European Union has developed its European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP), which includes as one of its options action supported by the 
assets and capabilities of NATO. The endeavors of the European Union to create 
decision-making and operational structures separate from those of the Alliance have 
caused some problems in NATO-EU relations. According to a Congressional Research 
Service report, “ESDP is intended to allow the European Union to make decisions and 
conduct military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged; ESDP is not aimed 
at usurping NATO’s collective defense role.”2 These structural changes have affected 
most NATO and EU countries but especially the non-EU European NATO allies such as 
Iceland, Norway and Turkey and the non-European NATO allies such as Canada and the 
United States. 
                                                 
1 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New 
York:  Columbia University Press, 2002), 33. 
2 Kristin Archick,  The European Union: Questions and Answers, Congressional Research Service 
Report for Congress, RS21372, 27 December 2005. 
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Since the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the European Union has supported the goal of a 
common security and defense organization and has devoted resources to this project. The 
Western European Union (WEU) became the defense arm of the European Union, and 
Turkey had an associate membership status in the WEU, like Norway. However, in 1999-
2000 the EU incorporated most of the WEU’s institutions. This structural change 
downgraded the significance of Turkey’s WEU associate member status. Under the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) Turkey would not be able to participate in 
European Union military exercises or in the EU institutions that had previously been part 
of the WEU. As Tofte has noted, “Turkey was for a long time seen as the greatest test and 
largest challenge for the ESDP project.”3 
Turkey is determined to participate in ESDP decision making and operations as 
much as possible. Turkey as a NATO member has on some occasions threatened to block 
the European Union’s use of NATO assets and capabilities for an EU-led operation, 
notably when Turkey has not been part of the decision-making. This policy is based on 
Turkey’s right not to be a part of the force implementing a plan (and not to subsidize the 
EU’s use of commonly funded NATO assets) when Turkey has not been part of the EU 
decision-making process. The participation problem is another unsolved issue. Turkey 
opposes the distribution of NATO information to the EU members that are not members 
of NATO’s Partnership for Peace and that have not concluded information security 
agreements with NATO in that framework, namely Malta and the Republic of Cyprus.4 
This situation is creating a serious problem in cooperation between NATO and the EU.  
Turkey is prepared to participate in ESDP operations, and with its well-trained 
armed forces Turkey has played an active role in Bosnia and Kosovo. Although Turkey 
has served as a buffer zone for the security of Europe, Turkey has some concerns about 
its homeland security and other issues, such as arrangements concerning the Aegean Sea 
                                                 
3 Sunniva Tofte, NATO, ESDP and the role of the non-EU European Allies in the emerging European 
Security Order, A chapter of PhD thesis, 16.  
4 It should be noted that the Turkish Republic does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus. References 
in this work to the “Republic of Cyprus” are made to conform to the academic literature but do not 
constitute recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by the author.   
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and Cyprus. Turkey’s quest for membership in the European Union is another serious 
issue. All these issues are, moreover, closely related.  
Some of the deadlocks in the cooperation between NATO and the European 
Union are caused by political and security problems involving Cyprus, Greece and 
Turkey. The unresolved problems include the Aegean Sea, international recognition of 
the political rights of Turkish Cypriots, and local arms competitions. Turkey has been a 
dependable ally in NATO since 1952 and wishes to have good relations with its Western 
partners. However, Turkey is not a member of the EU and therefore not a part of the 
ESDP project. Some members of the European Union, such as Austria and France, seem 
to be ready to reject Turkey’s prospective membership despite the strategic importance of 
Turkey for the EU’s security environment.  
B. IMPORTANCE   
Cooperation between NATO and the European Union depends on the agreement 
of their members to the changed structure of their relationship. While Turkey has been a 
valued NATO ally since 1952, the relationship between Turkey and the European Union 
has a long and less harmonious history. 5  
As Sunniva Tofte has observed, “Turkey’s relationship with the EC [European 
Community] was first formalized through the 1963 Ankara Agreement, which gave 
Turkey associate membership of the EC.”6 In this long and poor relationship, Europeans 
have been testing Turkey’s patience. In order to promote peace and security in the Middle 
East region, ensure access to energy supplies and pursue commercial relations with local 
businesses, the European Union and NATO have to solve the problems affecting Turkey.7  
Turkey has been a NATO ally and crucial to the efficacy of the alliance since 
1952. However, Turkey’s security concerns have changed since the end of the Cold War. 
Turkey has felt insecure and less protected by NATO’s security umbrella, because 
                                                 
5 Tofte, NATO, ESDP and the role of the non-EU European Allies, 16.  
6 Ibid., 17. 
7 Richard Weitz, Towards a New Turkey-NATO Partnership in Central Asia (Vol. 5, No. 2, Summer 
2006.  
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Turkey has faced several new challenges to its internal and external security, which have 
taken the place of the previous Soviet threat. The EU’s attempts to create its own security 
and defense policy have left Turkey feeling isolated in its unstable and unbalanced 
region. In cooperation with the United States and other allies, Turkey has to establish its 
own security in its challenging environment at the crossroads of the Middle East, Europe 
and Asia.  
Stability and peace in the Middle East and the Mediterranean are related to 
security in Europe and America. To achieve this goal, the Middle East needs a powerful 
Turkey in order to construct a bridge of dialogue and cooperation among cultures and 
states. Turkey has historically-based good relations with most of the Middle East and has 
a considerable association with Europe and America. This geostrategic, religious and 
historical advantage makes Turkey indispensable for establishing peace in the Middle 
East. Turkey still has great strategic importance for NATO and Europe, as in the past. 
The subject examined in this thesis, Turkey’s role in NATO-European Union 
cooperation, is important because the future of ESDP and the EU’s relations with the 
Middle East and Asia will be significantly shaped by Turkey’s role. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The pursuit of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and subsequent developments in this regard has to be 
evaluated from both NATO and European Union perspectives. In both cases Turkey is a 
most important common factor that influences decision-making about the future of these 
organizations.  
The post-Cold War strategy of NATO has focused on new challenges since the 
disappearance of the Soviet threat, and the Alliance has continued to exist as a functional 
organization. According to the new strategy of NATO, the Middle East is a most 
important region in which the Allies pursue collective security aims. NATO is 
significantly influenced by the United States. Therefore, relations between NATO and 
Turkey are sometimes shaped by U.S.-Turkey relations. The United States is more aware 
of Turkey’s importance in the Middle East than are some European nations. According to 
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Henri Barkey of Lehigh University, “Ankara's actual contribution to Washington's 
challenges went well beyond the Middle East. Turks collaborated with the allies in both 
Bosnia and Kosovo. It steadfastly improved relations with Bulgaria and Romania, took 
the lead in organizing Black Sea region institutions, and thus proved to be a source of 
stability in the Balkans.”8 Turkey’s contribution to global security is not negligible when 
“its unswerving support for the trans-Atlantic alliance through the Cold War, and 
recently… its substantial troop deployment to Afghanistan”9 and other military 
contributions are considered. 
In 1999 the European Union decided to frame a common security and defense 
policy to enhance its ability to respond to international crises. This decision derived in 
part from the instability in the Balkans since the early 1990s.The Balkans experience 
demonstrated that the actual operational capability of the European Union was limited. 
However, the Middle East has emerged as clearly the most unstable and yet most 
valuable region of the world with its vital energy resources.   
In the words of a British scholar, Jolyon Howorth, the ESDP is “a project to 
confer upon the EU the ability to take collective decisions relating to regional security 
and to deploy a range of instruments, including military instruments, in operations of 
crisis management, peace-keeping and, if necessary, peace-enforcement (preferably with 
a legal mandate), as a distinctive European contribution to the overall objectives of the 
Atlantic Alliance and in consultation with both European members of NATO and non-
allied EU accession candidates.”10 One of the EU’s aims in establishing the ESDP is to 
acquire certain operational capabilities. The EU is utilizing NATO assets and capabilities 
in operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this situation concerns Turkey’s 
defense policy as a NATO member. As Yasar Yakış observed in 2005, “The EU does not 
yet possess suitable infrastructure for planning a military operation and for carrying out 
                                                 
8 Henri J. Barkey, Turkey’s Strategic Future: A U.S. Perspectiv , Prepared for the CEPS/IISS 
European Security Forum, Brussels, 12 May 2003. 
9 The Hon. Alexander Downer, NATO in the Age of Global Challenges, Speech of Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Australia, 10 February 2007.  
10 Jolyon Howorth, Why ESDP is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance (Columbia University.  
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command and control tasks. It is on its way to acquire such a capability.”11 The ESDP 
will require a long time to acquire military forces able to deploy to the Middle East or 
Asia. The European Union will therefore need NATO’s help, including Turkey’s 
acceptance and assistance in its operations. 
Turkey has a specific role in fulfilling both NATO’s and the European Union’s 
security and defense objectives. As noted by Meltem Müftüler Baç, in the European 
Security Strategy adopted by the EU Council in December 2003, “the EU identified its 
main security concerns as terrorism, illegal trafficking of drugs and people and 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”12 Moreover, this document “focused on 
the dangers of instability in the perimeters of the EU, especially in the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East region. Instability in the Mediterranean Region carries significant 
security threats for the EU, as it would have the capacity to diffuse into European 
territory. In addition, stability in these regions is essential to prevent unwanted migration 
from the Mediterranean to Europe.”13 Terrorism is the most crucial current threat for the 
EU’s own security, and terrorist threats have often been supported from the region where 
Turkey is located. Turkey is also still important for the European Union’s security 
because of its stabilizer role in the Middle East. However, Turkey has been at the margins 
of the European Union’s security and defense planning since the early 1990s, even 
though Turkey has played an active role in NATO Europe’s defense for decades. 
The relations between the United States and the European Union have become 
more complicated since the early 1990s. The members of the European Union ignited an 
extremely challenging movement by creating a security community apart from NATO in 
order to reduce their dependence on the United States for their security and defense. As 
noted by Baç, “Turkey’s accession to the EU will be a critical development in 
transatlantic relations”14. Turkey can repair the divergence that has emerged between the 
                                                 
11 Yasar Yakış, The Role of Turkey and EU in the Middle East, Chairman of the European Union 
Commission in the Turkish Parliament, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the XV. Economic Forum-
Krynica, 7-10 September.  
12Meltem Müftüler Baç, Turkey and European Security, IAI-TESEV Report.  
13 Ibid., 20.  
14 Ibid. 
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United States and the European Union. “Since Turkey is an active NATO member, its 
role in the Mediterranean dialogue could also contribute to NATO-EU cooperation.”15 
In establishing the ESDP, the European Union has faced serious problems. The 
European Union needs cooperation with NATO to continue its ESDP project. As Baç has 
pointed out, “The EU-NATO cooperation is highly important for the EU’s 
operationalization of its security and defense role.”16 Otherwise the European Union 
would have to increase its military expenditures to undertake operations on its own. At 
this point, as Baç has argued, “Turkey will contribute significantly to the EU’s military 
capabilities, since one of the major problems confronted by the EU is the 
capabilities/expectations gap; the Turkish membership might increase the EU’s military 
operability, both in terms of logistics and bases.”17 
D. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
In order to help the defense and security policy decision makers of Turkey, this 
thesis evaluates the role of Turkey since 1991 in the relations between NATO and the 
European Union, notably with respect to the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy. 
Turkey’s defense strategies will be influenced to some extent by the boundaries of the 
ESDP. Moreover, the EU membership status of Turkey will be determined in the near 
future. This will be a milestone for Turkey and the European Union not only from a 
political viewpoint but also from a security and defense viewpoint. Turkey’s options will 
vary according to its defense strategies in the future. This thesis offers an analysis of the 
impact of Turkey’s policies on EU-NATO relations as a NATO member and as a 
candidate for full membership in the European Union.   
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II examines Turkish-EU relations 
prior to the ESDP. This concerns the period from the framing of the Maastricht Treaty in 
1991 to the EU’s formal acceptance in 1999 of the ESDP proposed by France and the 
United Kingdom. Chapter III considers the ESDP from 1999, the starting point, to 2004, 
                                                 
15Baç, Turkey and European Security, IAI-TESEV Report, 23. 
16Ibid., 19. 
17Ibid., 16-17.  
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when the EU enlarged by taking in ten new members, including Malta and the Republic 
of Cyprus. Chapter IV analyzes problems in NATO-EU relations in the most recent 












II. TURKISH-EU RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE ESDP (1991-1999) 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The early 1990s were the transition years of a new world order and changing 
security perceptions. This process started with the end of the Cold War, followed by the 
1990-1991 Gulf War and the escalation of conflict in the former Yugoslavia. In response 
to these structural shifts on the international stage, national governments redefined their 
security and defense policies to shape their future roles. In the light of these events, the 
member states of the European Community decided that the time for acting as a military 
power had come. In December 1991, the European Union (EU) was formed on the basis 
of shared values and interests with the Maastricht Treaty, “which consists of three pillars: 
the European Communities, common foreign and security policy and police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters.”18 With the creation of the European Union, the relations 
between Turkey and the transforming EU and NATO began a new cooperation phase.  
In fact, relations between European integration institutions and Turkey have a 
long history. These relations “started in July 1959 when the government of Turkey sought 
an association agreement with the European Economic Community. The agreement, also 
known as the Ankara agreement, was duly signed on 9 September 1963.”19 This 
agreement gave Turkey an associate membership that was expected to lead to full 
membership later. However, the development of improved relations between Turkey and 
the European Community was inhibited for several years because of Turkey’s Cyprus 
intervention in 1974. 
Significant steps toward improved cooperation were not taken until the late 1980s. 
“Turkey applied for membership of the WEU in 1988, following its application for 
membership of the European Community in 1987.”20 One of the objectives of the 
Maastricht Treaty was establishing a common foreign and security policy; this endowed 
                                                 
18 Activities of the European Union, Summaries of Legislation. 
19 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Turkey and the ESDP: A Fact- Sheet. 
20 Esra Doğan, Turkey in the New European Security and Defense Architecture, Center for Strategic 
Research, 163.  
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the WEU with more responsibilities in order to enable it to play a significant role as an 
instrument of the EU. Moreover, at the 1992 Petersberg meeting the WEU members 
agreed to use military forces for specific types of operations in addition to collective 
defense. The WEU Council of Ministers agreed that the Petersberg tasks cover 
“humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peacemaking.”21  
Turkey was aware of the importance of the WEU. After the WEU invited the non-
EU European members of NATO in 1992 to become associate members of the WEU in 
order to be able to participate fully in WEU-led operations, Turkey started to function as 
part of the security and defense branch of the European Union. The WEU extended 
Associate Membership invitations to Iceland, Norway and Turkey in 1992, but this status 
did not become effective until Greece was admitted to the WEU as a full member in 
March 1995. Moreover, Turkey took part in the decision making process of WEU-led 
operations.  
The other milestone was the Berlin Agreement in 1996, whereby “NATO agreed 
to support WEU-led crisis-management operations as part of the development of a 
‘European Security and Defense Identity’ within NATO.”22 Some problems nonetheless 
arose on using NATO capabilities and assets and sharing information. In order to give the 
EU more responsibility, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 “furthered CFSP by 
establishing the post of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security  
Policy. The Treaty also strengthened the ties between the EU and the WEU and increased 
the responsibilities for peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks by incorporating the 
Petersberg tasks.”23  
The Saint Malo declaration in 1998 led to the formation of the European Security 
and Defense Policy, which called for the EU “to play its full role on the international 
                                                 
21 Europa Glossary, Gateway to the European Union. 
22 Leo Michel, NATO-EU Cooperation in Operations, Research Paper No. 31 (NATO Defense 
College, February 2007), italics in the original. 
23Corneliu Manole, The Emergence of The Triangular Security Link: US-EU-TURKEY, Building a 
new European security framework? (Eurojournal, February 2004). 
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stage” and gather “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military 
forces.”24 The ESDP meant that the EU would no longer rely on the WEU as its CFSP 
instrument. 
This chapter of the thesis reviews the historical background of Turkey-EU 
relations and the important treaties that have shaped the foundations of the European 
Security and Defense Policy. This review is intended to clarify the role of Turkey in 
trans-Atlantic security relations by analyzing its position from 1991 to 1999. 
B.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKEY-EU RELATIONS 
European societies had regarded the Turks as a threat to their cultural, religious 
and territorial independence since the expansion of the Ottoman Empire through Istanbul, 
the Balkans and Central Europe after the 13th century. This counter pressure of the 
Ottomans against the several European crusades to the Muslim lands and peoples 
contributed to the establishment of a common European identity. As Meltem Müftüler 
Baç, a faculty member of the Sabanci University Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, 
noted, the European Identity “is based on a common cultural heritage, with foundations 
in ancient Greece, Christianity, and Europe of Enlightenment.”25 Erkan Erdogdu, a 
graduate of the Department of International Relations at the Middle East Technical 
University in Turkey, pointed out that “Turks have been a part of Europe geographically 
since their arrival in the 11th century; economically since the expansion of trade routes in 
the 16th century; and diplomatically since the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire in the 
Concert of Europe in 1856.” 26 The inclusion of the Turks in the European Concert was 
significant because, “For the first time, Europeans formally recognized the Turks as a 
part of the European society of states, although this change was totally restricted to state-
to-state relations and had nothing to do with cultural issues.”27 
                                                 
24Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defense Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke, England, and 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 33. 
25 Meltem Muftuler Baç, “Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe,” Turkish Studies (Vol. 1, 
No. 1, Spring 2000), 26. 
26 Erkan Erdoğdu, “Turkey and Europe: Undivided but not United,” Middle East Review of 
International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2002), 40. 
27 Ibid., 41. 
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The Republic of Turkey, with its westernized secular and democratic regime, has 
been in close relations with European countries since its foundation in 1923 as the 
principal successor state to the theocratically-oriented Ottoman Empire. Turkey 
considered participation in European society as the right decision in order to reach the 
standards of civilized and modern nations and indeed to become part of modern Western 
civilization. Indeed, this approach had started in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, not 
only in the military and technology areas but also ideologically in the minds of people 
familiar with the modern standards of Europe in the late 19th century. According to the 
terms of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the Republic of Turkey was established over the 
ruins of the Ottoman Empire, which had lost most of its assets and capabilities because of 
long wars. In the mid-1930s the international and political environment was changing. 
After constructing its internal structure, “Turkey endeavored to form a security belt on its 
western and eastern borders. It played a leading role in the establishment of the Balkan 
Entente (Turkey, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia) in 1934...In the wake of World War 
II, Turkey became a founding member of the United Nations in 1945 and the Council of 
Europe in 1949. As a result of growing threats to security in Europe, it joined the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952.”28 In September 1959, Turkey and Greece applied 
for association membership in the EEC (European Economic Community, the forerunner 
of the European Union) Council of Ministers. The 1960 military intervention in Turkey 
delayed the negotiations, but Turkey became an Associate Member of the EEC via the 
Ankara Association Agreement. This agreement was signed on 12 September 1963 and 
became effective on 1 December 1964. “The EC-Turkey Association Agreement 
projected three stages for Turkey-EC relations: preparatory, transitional and final. The 
preparatory stage was intended to be a period in which the Community would provide 
unilateral concessions and financial aid to Turkey while Turkey would take appropriate 
measures to develop its economy and to prepare itself for the transitional stage. The 
transitional stage of between 12 and 22 years would aim at creating a customs union 
between EC and Turkey. The agreement also included the possibility of a third final 
                                                 
28 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
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stage, which would bring Turkey to full membership.”29 An additional protocol, 
concluded in 1970, entered into force in 1973.  
In the Cold War era, the EC and Turkey established a relationship of a strategic 
and political cooperation through the significant impact of the United States and NATO, 
despite some disputes among states. These disputes and economic concerns slowed down 
the speed of the negotiations and the implementation of the stages before membership. 
The 1960 and 1980 coup-d`etats in Turkey had damaged EC-Turkey relations. Besides 
this, disagreements between Turkey and Greece, especially the Cyprus crisis and 
Turkey’s military intervention to prevent the ethnic mass killings of Turkish Cypriots in 
1974, had stopped the negotiations for a while. After the mid-1980s Turkey’s economy 
had faced some structural changes, and Turkey became more confident in its political 
perspective. As noted by Erkan Erdoğdu, “The growth of confidence in Turkey’s 
economic performance and democracy together with Prime Minister Turgut Ozal’s more 
outward-looking foreign policy culminated in the Turkish application for full EC 
membership on April 14, 1987, which came as a surprise both to the EC institutions and 
member governments.”30  
Another milestone for the relationship between Turkey and the EU was the end of 
the Cold War, when the power balance and threat perceptions totally changed. The 
fundamental changes in Europe included “the emergence of new independent states, the 
reunification of Germany, and the spread of pluralist democracy and free market 
economies,”31  as well as new threats to security and regional stability, such as ethnic 
nationalism and terrorism. In this respect, at first the EC discounted the importance and 
position of Turkey in this recently shaped security environment. However, the 
developments after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, especially the 1990-1991 Gulf 
War and the instability and ethnic conflicts in the Balkan region, underlined the necessity 
of Turkey’s support to establish stability in the region. 
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Turkey’s 1987 application to become a member of the EC was an unexpectedly 
early movement by Turkey in light of the transforming structure of the EC. 
Consequently, “instead of accession negotiations, Turkey was offered a number of 
initiatives such as a customs union in order to prepare the country for entry. In 1995, a 
customs union was formed.”32 However, without Turkey participating in the decision 
making mechanism of the European Union, the Customs Union would only serve the 
interests of the EU members, which used it as a bargaining instrument for the applicants 
to the EU. As noted by Erdoğdu, “In short, for the critics, the Customs Union is just an 
artificial and one-sided system designed to incorporate Turkey within the EU without 
granting membership. Under the Customs Union framework, Turkey is in a position of 
implementer but not decision maker.”33 Turkey was nonetheless the only country that 
accepted the EU’s Customs Union offer without being assured and guaranteed full 
membership in the EU. 
The relations between the EU and Turkey had become more important after the 
economic and technological developments associated with the emergence of computers 
and the internet in the last quarter of the 20th century. Meanwhile, Turkey became a major 
trade partner of the EU. As stated in an International Crisis Group Europe Report, 
“Whereas in 1980 just one third of Turkey’s trade was with EU states, it was half on the 
eve of the 1995 Customs Union and has stayed that way, while overall trade has 
quadrupled. Over the ensuing decade Turkey has been the EU’s sixth or seventh biggest 
partner. Germany, whose exports to the country have risen 54 per cent since 2003, is 
usually Turkey’s biggest customer and supplier.”34 
C.  TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND RELATED AGREEMENTS 
The period of transition to a new security and economic environment after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the disagreements among European states 
regarding the rising ethnic conflict issues in the Balkan region led the Europeans to think 
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of their common voice and policy while sharing certain interests. Moreover, the United 
Nations was also concerned about protecting human rights by intervening in the internal 
affairs of the new sovereign states in the Balkans.35 Europeans started to think about 
supplying their own security through their own decisions and capacity. As Jolyon 
Howorth noted, “during the mid-1990s, the EU had attempted to organize its security 
arrangements entirely within the NATO framework by developing a European Security 
and Defense Identity (ESDI) based on European-only forces, a European-only command 
chain, and complex arrangements for borrowing essential assets from the Alliance.”36  
In the early 1990s, the EU sought to establish a common union in all policy fields 
and to carry forward its enlargement policy by several treaties and agreements. The 
European Council meeting in Rome in December 1990 launched intergovernmental 
conferences intended to deepen European integration. These conferences led to the 
Maastricht Summit in December 1991. The Maastricht Treaty, also called the Treaty on 
European Union, signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, entered into force on 1 
November 1993. The objectives of the Maastricht Treaty were not limited to economic 
progress in the common market. In this context, the Treaty of Maastricht responds to five 
key goals: 
• strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the institutions;  
• improve the effectiveness of the institutions;  
• establish economic and monetary union;  
• develop the Community social dimension;  
• establish a common foreign and security policy. 37 
This treaty was a turning point in the integration and enlargement process of the 
European Union, which consists of three pillars: the European Communities, the common 
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foreign and security policy, and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. These 
pillars are officially explained as follows: 
The first pillar consists of the European Community, the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and Euratom and concerns the domains in which the Member States 
share their sovereignty via the Community institutions. The process known as the 
Community method applies in this connection, i.e., a proposal by the European 
Commission, its adoption by the Council and the European Parliament and the 
monitoring of compliance with Community law by the Court of Justice. 
The second pillar establishes common foreign and security policy (CFSP), 
enshrined in Title V of the Treaty on European Union. This replaces the provisions of the 
Single European Act and allows Member States to take joint action in the field of foreign 
policy. This pillar involves an intergovernmental decision-making process, which largely 
relies on unanimity. The Commission and Parliament play a modest role and the Court of 
Justice has no say in this area. 
The third pillar concerns cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs 
(JHA), provided for in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. The Union is expected 
to undertake joint action so as to offer European citizens a high level of protection in the 
area of freedom, security and justice. The decision-making process is also 
intergovernmental.38 
The Treaty of Maastricht established the foundation of the common foreign and 
security policy of the European Union states. 
A few months after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, the 
foreign and defense ministers of the WEU organization came together in Petersberg in 
June 1992 and approved the famous Petersberg Tasks. These tasks were important to 
promote international security and peace by providing the basis for the legitimacy of the 
European Union’s use of the WEU to conduct crisis-management operations. 
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As stated in the Europa Glossary, “The ‘Petersberg tasks’ are an integral part of 
the European security and defence policy (ESDP). They were explicitly included in the 
[Amsterdam and Nice versions of the] Treaty on European Union (Article 17) and cover: 
• humanitarian and rescue tasks;  
• peace-keeping tasks;  
• tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” 39  
The June 1996 Berlin Agreement “created the possibility that the WEU, for the 
first time, might become a militarily effective organization, able to respond to at least 
some of the limited range of agreed Petersberg Tasks.”40 This agreement gave the 
opportunity to the European Union to make use of NATO’s assets and capabilities, called 
“separable but not separate” forces, in WEU-led missions. The importance of this 
agreement can be easily observed. 
The grand bargain sealed at Berlin and Brussels in June 1996 had several key 
elements, of which the following were most important: 
• There could be “WEU-led” operations, including “planning and exercising 
of command elements and forces.” 
• NATO would identify “types of separable but not separate capabilities, 
assets and support assets . . . HQs [Headquarters], HQ elements and 
command structures . . . which could be made available, subject to 
decision by the [North Atlantic Council]” and subsequent “monitoring of 
the use” of these forces by NATO. This continuing role of NATO in the 
use of its “assets” was later broadened to provide for their “return or 
recall,” if they proved to be needed by the alliance—e.g., in the event of a 
competing crisis or conflict… 
• All European members of NATO would be able to take part in WEU-led 
operations, including European command arrangements if they chose to do 
so (this was in particular a reference to Turkey). 41 
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All Alliance members, including the largest contributor to NATO, the United 
States, agreed to the WEU’s access to NATO’s collective assets under WEU command, 
even in autonomous operations in which the Alliance was not fully engaged. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in October 1997, and supported the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy by strengthening “the ties between the EU and the 
WEU and increased the EU’s responsibilities for peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks by 
incorporating the Petersberg tasks.” 42 
As noted in an official EU publication, the aim of negotiations in the Amsterdam 
Treaty “was clear: to create the political and institutional conditions to enable the 
European Union to meet the challenges of the future such as the rapid evolution of the 
international situation, the globalization of the economy and its impact on jobs, the fight 
against terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking, ecological problems and 
threats to public health.”43 In order to achieve these goals the European Union had to be 
able to defend its interests more effectively and coherently on the international scene.  
The Amsterdam Treaty supported the idea of the CFSP and took this policy into 
action. As stated in an official publication, the section on the CFSP looks at the following 
reforms: 
• the creation of a new instrument: the common strategy;  
• improved decision-making thanks to greater use of qualified majority 
voting in the Council;  
• the creation of the post of High Representative for the common foreign 
and security policy to give the CFSP greater prominence and coherence;  
• the establishment of a policy planning and early warning unit to encourage 
joint analysis of international developments and their consequences;  
• the incorporation of the “Petersberg tasks” into Title V (CFSP) of the 
Treaty on European Union, to demonstrate the Member States' common 
desire to safeguard security in Europe through operations to provide 
humanitarian aid and restore peace;  
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• the simplification of the procedures for funding the CFSP.44 
These agreements and treaties shaped the basic structure and the main aims of the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy prior to the emergence of the European 
Security and Defense Policy in 1998-1999. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Turkey’s relations with the European Community and shifting security 
requirements have shaped the cooperation between NATO and the EU in the past and 
will do so in the future. The period from 1991 (the emergence of the EU and its CFSP) to 
1999 (the launch of the ESDP) was full of military operations, structural changes in 
security organizations, and negotiations among states and security organizations. During 
these years, the negotiations between Turkey and the EU made remarkable progress. 
However, there were some unresolved issues among the parties, such as the EU’s access 
to NATO assets and capabilities, Turkey’s role in European security decision-making, 
Turkey’s full membership in the EU, and disagreements arising from the enlargement 
policies of NATO and the EU. 
Turkey’s relationship to the WEU, the military branch of the EU from 1991 to 
1999, became a long-term question affecting NATO and the EU. Turkey’s objective is 
full integration in the developing security, defense and foreign policy structure of the EU. 
However, Turkey has already been an essential contributor to European security through 
NATO. After Turkey’s application for full membership in the WEU, Turkey was offered 
an associate membership, a position parallel to its EU membership level. Afterwards, 
Turkey along with Norway and Iceland became an associate member of the WEU on 20 
November 1992 (a status which became effective in 1995).45 Although Turkey wanted to 
be a full member of the WEU, the associate member position provided a valuable 
strategic role in the development of the ESDI by the WEU within NATO. As Ramazan 
Gozen stated, “The WEU associate membership provided Turkey with a place and some 
institutional rights in the WEU’s decision-making processes as well as in the WEU’s 
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non-Article 5 operations. Turkey’s status in the WEU system granted Turkey the right to 
become closely involved in the European security architecture. Most importantly, Turkey 
had the right to participate in the meetings of the WEU Council and its working groups 
and subsidiary bodies under certain conditions.”46 
Though the EU had shown only a little encouragement to Turkey, Ankara had 
responded to this movement by joining the Customs Union without any guarantee of full 
membership. Moreover, Turkey played an active role in international peacekeeping 
operations in most of the crises concerning security and stability in the region, even more 
than several EU member states, within the framework of the U.N., NATO and WEU-led 
missions.  
The WEU was for several years the organization for implementation of the EU’s 
security and defense policies. Therefore, as Osman Şengül stated, “Turkey got rather 
disturbed once the EU began to develop ESDP terminating the WEU and not taking a 
good care of the status of non-EU European NATO allies under the new arrangement.” 47 
Turkey had contributed to the security of Europe for more than half a century and had 
contributed remarkably to the emergence of what became the European Security and 
Defense Policy. 
In this period, after concluding the Maastricht Treaty, the foundation of the EU, 
the EU furthered its CFSP by including the WEU’s Petersberg Tasks in the Amsterdam 
version of the Treaty on European Union and established agreements with NATO about 
using the Alliance’s assets and capabilities in its autonomous peace operations. The EU 
was ready to develop its own autonomous operational power instead of relying on the 
WEU, which was closely linked to NATO. 
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III. ESDP (1999-2004) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was launched in place of the 
Western European Union (WEU) as the defense and security institution of the European 
Union in 1999. Before ESDP, “the WEU was the only existing security structure which 
acted as an interface between the EU and NATO.”48 However, the WEU was not 
employed to deal with certain security challenges. Moreover, it was dependent upon 
NATO and was regarded as having a relatively weak political structure. The ESDP 
reflects the desire of the EU to play a greater role on the international stage. In order to 
achieve this aim, the ESDP has to be backed by credible military power. The ESDP is 
intended to resolve the cooperation problems between NATO and the EU after the 
transfer of most WEU institutions to the EU. 
In 1999, a political and strategic project, called the European Security and 
Defense Policy, started “with a common body of instruments which all member states —
except Denmark — agree to implement collectively and which has acquired its own 
distinct profile and footprint.” 49 The emergence of the ESDP was a milestone in relations 
between the EU and Turkey that affected cooperation between NATO and the EU. The 
ESDP has provoked debates about its purpose and functionality because this institution 
has brought a significant change in trans–Atlantic relations. Michael Rühle, an expert at 
NATO Headquarters, remarked that the majority of NATO Allies “now organize 
themselves in a framework that also covers security — and conducts its own dialogue 
with Washington.” 50  Moreover, Rühle observed, “A European Union with a distinct 
military dimension constitutes the most profound institutional change within the 
transatlantic security community since its creation almost six decades ago.” 51   
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Turkey as a WEU associate member had some concerns about the EU’s ESDP 
displacing the WEU. “One of the most controversial and sensitive issues for Turkey 
during this process was the redefinition of the future role of the non-EU members of 
NATO within the new ESDP framework.”52 As noted by Sühnaz Yılmaz, an assistant 
professor at Koc University, “Turkey had a high stake in maintaining the institutional 
status quo, especially since the ESDP excludes Turkey from its decision-making 
mechanisms.”53 Therefore, Turkey was right to be concerned about the implications of 
the ESDP for Turkish interests.  
The exclusion of Turkey from the EU’s decision-making structure caused some 
disagreements in NATO-EU cooperation. The main debate after the ESDP’s emergence 
has concerned NATO-EU relations. As David Yost has noted, “In the April 1999 
Washington Summit Communiqué the Allies simultaneously approved fundamental 
guidelines for the development of effective NATO-EU cooperation. These guidelines, 
including ‘assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to 
military planning for EU-led operations’ and ‘the presumption of availability to the EU of 
pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations,’ have 
been incorporated into the EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreements.”54 However, this assured 
access commitment led to a significant problem because its fulfillment depends on the 
non-EU NATO members of the alliance.  
In Madeleine Albright’s statement, in December 1998, directly after the Saint-
Malo Declaration, the US concerns about ESDP were clearly articulated: “First, we want 
to avoid decoupling: NATO is the expression of the indispensable transatlantic link. It 
should remain an organization of sovereign allies, where European decision-making is 
not unhooked from broader alliance decision-making. Second, we want to avoid 
duplication: defense resources are too scarce for allies to conduct force planning, operate 
command structures, and make procurement decisions twice — once at NATO and once 
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more at the EU. And third, we want to avoid any discrimination against NATO members 
who are not EU members.” 55 The ESDP project of the EU and the use of NATO assets in 
EU-led operations have been supported by the United States and the other NATO Allies. 
However, the establishment of the ESDP affected Turkey directly. Turkey was excluded 
from participating in the EU’s ESDP, although Turkey had been an associate member of 
the WEU, and it had been willing to approve lending NATO assets to the EU.56  
This chapter considers the initial period of the ESDP, its fundamental drivers, and 
the multifaceted problems that arose after the major shifts in the institutional structure of 
the European Union between 1999 and 2004, when the enlargement of the European 
Union with ten new members took place. 
B. THE EMERGENCE OF ESDP OVER WEU 
The WEU’s approval of the Petersberg tasks in 1992, the NATO Berlin 
Agreement in 1996, and the provisions of the Amsterdam version of the Treaty on 
European Union dealing with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy all 
contributed to the emergence of ESDP.  
NATO had agreed that the WEU could use NATO assets and capabilities on 
WEU-led missions at the 1996 Berlin ministerial meeting. However, the 1996 Berlin 
arrangements were not enough for the European Union, which had plans to become an 
international actor conducting its own security and defense policies. Therefore, the Saint 
Malo Declaration was released by the leading officials of the British and French 
governments, namely Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair, in December 1998; and this was 
the beginning of what became the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). 
According to the Saint Malo Declaration, 
1. The European Union needs to be in position to play its full role on the 
international stage… 
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2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed 
up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. 
3. The different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be respected. 
4.  …the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military                     
means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO’s European pillar 
or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework). 
Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, 
and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defense industry and 
technology.57 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the EU faced international conflicts 
and problems in and between sovereign states, and was therefore forced to accept greater 
responsibility for international security and stability. Moreover, the United States focus 
on the Middle East showed the need for EU nations to acquire reliable military 
capabilities to conduct interventions and humanitarian and peace operations in the 
problematic areas of their region as a respected political actor. 58   
In December 1999, at the European Council in Helsinki, the ESDP was formally 
launched and the EU members expressed a willingness to accept the consequences of this 
decision. At the Helsinki summit, in order to accomplish the full range of Petersberg 
tasks, the EU “proposed a Headline Goal of 60,000 troops plus appropriate aerial and 
naval support, to be deployable within 60 days and sustainable for a year, to be in place 
by 2003.” 59 
Soon after the Saint-Malo Declaration, at the Washington Summit of NATO in 
April 1999, the plans for cooperation between NATO and the EU had to be revised 
because of the shift in attention from the WEU to the EU and the consequent irrelevance 
of previous agreements with the WEU. NATO-EU cooperation started a new page and 
new principles of cooperation were needed. The NATO Allies at the Washington Summit 
committed to formulating the Berlin Plus agreements, which would be the next step in 
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cooperation between the EU and NATO in relation to the 1996 Berlin agreement, in order 
to “address EU access to NATO operational planning, capabilities and common assets, 
command options, and adaptation of NATO’s defense planning system.”60  
The Alliance was ready to consider the cooperation issues related to ESDP, which 
had replaced the WEU as the main vehicle of the European Union’s security and defense 
cooperation. As noted by David Yost, “The Allies declared that they were ‘ready to 
define and adopt the necessary agreements for ready access by the European Union to the 
collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a 
whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance,’ and added that these arrangements would 
address: Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military 
planning for EU-led operations; The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-
identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations; 
Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further 
developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his 
European responsibilities; The further adaptation of NATO’s defense planning system  
to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.”61 
These agreements allowed the EU to develop its own security and defense structure 
independent of NATO, but in cooperation with NATO, and thus without decreasing its 
security assurances from NATO regarding the use of NATO’s assets and capabilities. 
The Nice Treaty, in December 2000, also contained some amendments about EU 
enlargement and the formation of an autonomous military capacity deployable by an 
independent EU policy, in the name of ESDP. At Nice, the EU had proposed some plans 
for cooperation with NATO in order to benefit from NATO’s planning capabilities. 
These plans included assured access to NATO’s assets and capabilities without difficulty 
to avoid duplication. The Nice Summit also called for arrangements on the participation 
of the non-EU NATO European Allies in the ESDP project, such as Turkey and Norway.   
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In NATO’s Prague Summit Declaration in November 2002, the importance of 
stability in the Mediterranean for the security of Europe, and the significance of the 
cooperation between NATO and the EU are stated clearly. 62    
After a long dispute between Turkey and the European Union on the issue of the 
EU’s access to NATO’s assets and capabilities, “In March 2003 NATO and the EU 
announced that they had worked out a ‘Berlin Plus’ package of arrangements to allow the 
Alliance to support EU-led operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.”63 
The delay of this announcement of the Berlin Plus agreement revealed the problems 
raised by the transfer of most of the WEU’s institutions to the EU, including Turkey’s 
exclusion from the decision-making structure of the European Union. This agreement 
made possible the first experience of a NATO operation’s transition to EU leadership, as 
noted by Leo Michel: “In March 2003, a relatively small NATO crisis management 
operation in Macedonia, begun in August 2001, transitioned to EU leadership. In this first 
implementation experience for Berlin Plus, a small NATO headquarters remained in 
Skopje, including a Senior Civilian Representative and a Senior Military Representative, 
to assist Macedonian authorities in the development of security sector reform and 
adaptation to NATO standards.”64 Moreover, as noted in a NATO fact sheet, “between 19 
and 25 November 2003, the first joint NATO-EU crisis management exercise 
(CME/CMX 03) based on the standing 'Berlin-Plus' arrangements was held.”65 However, 
the problems were not solved properly and might block the EU’s use of NATO assets and 
capabilities unless the EU accepts the involvement of non-EU European members of 
NATO in its ESDP decision-making process. 
The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and subsequent terrorist attacks have 
affected the EU’s security and defense policy. These events had a positive impact on 
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NATO-EU cooperation on common policies against terrorism. As a result of these 
common perspectives, as noted by Jolyon Howorth, “after the start of the Iraq War in 
2003, the EU devised its first ever ‘Security Strategy’ document, which spelled out the 
broad outlines of its military objectives.”66 In the European Security Strategy, as Meltem 
Müftüler Baç, an associate professor at Sabanci University, noted, “the EU identified its 
main security concerns as terrorism, illegal trafficking of drugs and people and 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction…Instability in the Mediterranean Region 
carries significant security threats for the EU, as it would have the capacity to diffuse into 
European territory.”67  
The EU launched the ESDP in 1999 and established its fundamental structure 
with a sequence of treaties and agreements. However, when the EU shifted its focus of 
activity away from the WEU, it also broke off ties with allies — including Turkey —that 
had contributed much to European security. 
C. CHANGES IN NATO-EU RELATIONS AFTER ESDP  
1999 and the following years brought significant changes not only to the long-
term structure of the EU but also to trans-Atlantic relations. These changes were hopeful 
for both the EU and the United States with regard to establishing a new security and 
defense framework. As Sally McNamara, a senior policy analyst in European affairs, 
stated, “The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, Madrid in 2004, and 
London in 2005 profoundly demonstrate the new security threats facing the West.”68 
These threats formed common interests and concerns in security and defense policies by 
NATO and the EU. According to McNamara, “The European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP) has emerged as one of the biggest attempts to expand EU power to date, 
centralizing the most important tools of nation-statehood. The militarization of the 
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European Union marks one of the greatest geopolitical shifts in the transatlantic alliance 
since the end of the Second World War.”69  
The members of NATO and the EU are mostly common. More precisely, 84% of 
EU members are also NATO members.70 Thus, progress on NATO-EU relations depends 
on progress in operational cooperation by these two organizations. To develop this 
cooperation, NATO and the EU have implemented a series of transition and joint 
operations. However, there are some problems about participation and access to the assets 
and capabilities of NATO by the EU. The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in March-June 
1999 showed the limited operational capability of the EU without the assistance of the 
United States. In spite of this fact, the EU’s ESDP project has been supported by the 
United States, subject to the concerns expressed by Madeleine Albright in December 
1998. However, non-EU European members of NATO, such as Turkey and Norway, 
have been excluded from the EU’s decision-making structure, although they were 
associate members of the WEU.  
Jolyon Howorth has explained the changed conditions briefly: “As major security 
actors within NATO, Turkey and Norway had played important roles in WEU. That role 
abruptly ended with the inauguration of ESDP in 2000.” 71 Turkey and Norway tried to 
participate in the European Union’s security and defense decision-making structure and 
were willing to contribute to ESDP operations. “Although the EU, in spring 2000, 
instituted regular security and defense discussions between the COPS [Political and 
Security Committee]  and the six non-EU NATO members, as well as with all 15 non-EU 
European states, Turkey — strongly backed by USA — found this inadequate in three 
ways. First, it was widely recognized that most of the scenarios for regional 
destabilization had their locus in South-Eastern Europe — in Turkey’s ‘near abroad’.”72 
According to Bruce Kuniholm, director of Duke University's Institute of Policy Sciences 
and Public Affairs and chairman of Duke's Department of Public Policy Studies, “What 
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worries Turkey about the creation of an EU defense force is that areas near Turkey’s 
borders are those most likely to be the location of EU missions (13 of 16 possible crisis 
regions throughout the world cited in one NATO survey were in regions near Turkey). 
Because Turkey is a non-member of the EU, its representatives would be outside 
decision-making circles if the defense force were not closely tied to NATO.”73 Moreover, 
in some of the possible operations in this region Turkey would be required to participate 
directly in conflict near its borders. According to Mustafa Kibaroğlu, Assistant Professor 
of International Relations at Bilkent University in Turkey, “In such a case, EU 
intervention in conflicts in the immediate neighborhood of Turkey without Ankara’s 
active participation — both in the planning and in the operational phases — may not only 
severely damage Turkey’s interests, but also threaten its security.”74 
Howorth’s analysis continues as follows: “Second, this was particularly 
significant, viewed from Ankara, in the context of the unresolved disputes between 
Turkey and Greece over Aegean airspace and territorial waters, and over the divided 
island of Cyprus. Third, the matter was exacerbated by the EU’s longstanding reluctance 
to engage in discussions over Turkish membership of the Union.”75 For these reasons 
Turkey did not fully accept the principle of guaranteed access of the EU to NATO assets 
and capabilities and used its NATO membership to delay approval of the “Berlin Plus” 
agreement.  
Turkey’s situation created a genuine dilemma for both the EU and NATO. This 
dilemma stayed unresolved for more than two years and was resolved partly in order to 
give the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for a specific operation. This 
arrangement would not only avoid duplication of Allied forces in the same region, but 
would also provide the basis for improved operational capacity by supplying the EU with 
virtually automatic access to the assets even in its autonomous ESDP operations. As 
Kibaroğlu pointed out, “Turkey, as a non-member of the Union, has made it clear that it 
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would not give its unconditional approval to such a request, which would mean losing its 
control over the use of NATO assets in the future military operations of the EU. This is 
because Turkey fears that EU-led operations may well contradict its supreme national 
interests.”76 According to Osman Şengül, “Greece could veto Turkey’s participation in 
autonomous EU operations on regions of outmost strategic salience for Turkey and even 
it could press the EU to conduct a ‘Petersberg-type operation’ on Cyprus or Aegean 
Sea.”77   
It is entirely reasonable for the EU to establish an autonomous military force in 
accordance with the decision of the European Security and Defense Policy. As  Kibaroğlu 
has observed, “A sovereign political entity (the EU in this case) that has a parliament, a 
ministerial council, a full-fledged bureaucracy, as well as a flag and a banknote in 
circulation (the new euro) has the right, in theory, to make a claim to establish a military 
unit of its own. Otherwise, its sovereignty will be called into question. However, if that 
political entity has to depend on others' military assets and capabilities, it must 
acknowledge the need to share the decision-making authority, as well as the command 
and control, with those who somehow contribute to its capabilities.” 78 Turkey does not 
want to participate in an operation in which it has no role in the decision-making process. 
In contrast with Turkey’s exclusion from the decision-making autonomy of the ESDP, 
the EU depends on the united approval of the NATO Allies for use of NATO assets and 
capabilities in EU-led operations. As Kibaroğlu has noted, “Turkey insisted on being 
admitted to the decision-making mechanism whenever NATO assets would be called into 
action, and especially when the Union conducted military operations in Turkey's 
immediate neighborhood.” 79 
In the presence of these concerns, Turkey decided to use its NATO rights to delay 
agreement on the EU’s access to NATO assets and capabilities, which was envisaged in 
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the “Berlin Plus” arrangements. Turkey’s policy prevented the EU from utilizing 
NATO’s operational opportunities directly and complicated the ESDP’s 
operationalization. This long-standing problem was not solved until December 2002. The 
solution was reached through lengthy dialogues involving Turkey, the United Kingdom, 
the United States and the EU. “Ankara settled for ‘the fullest possible involvement’ in the 
EU’s security and defense decision-shaping process and automatic involvement in the 
event of an EU mission using NATO assets. Turkey was also given a formal guarantee 
that ESDP missions would not be deployed in the Aegean and that an EU force would not 
attack a NATO member state.”80 This agreement is known as the “Ankara document.” 
Greece had refused to accept the document for one year. Turkey, with this agreement, 
was confident about its security, and participated in most of the EU-led operations. 
However, Turkey demanded and deserved a position of responsibility equivalent to that 
in the WEU period in the decision-making and planning process of the ESDP. 
In the presence of these problems, the cooperation of NATO and the EU had 
faltered seriously. However, the relations of these two organizations developed after 
facing the new common asymmetric threats. The United States and the United Kingdom 
played the main role in NATO’s diplomacy regarding Turkey and the development of the 
European Security and Defense Policy and NATO-EU relations. 
 D. CONCLUSION 
The period from 1999 to 2004 started with the formal launch of the ESDP and 
ended with the enlargement of the EU. Between these significant milestones, were 
unexpected threats that required a collective response from NATO and the EU. The 
unfavorable situation of the non-EU European NATO members, especially Turkey, led to 
some disputes about the sharing of NATO assets and capabilities in EU-led operations. 
This situation would also create some disputes in conjunction with the participation 
problem in the years after the 2004 EU enlargement. 
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IV. ESDP (2004-PRESENT) 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The European Union established the ESDP in order to act as a more effective 
international security and stability actor in today’s international structure. In the changing 
strategic environment the non-EU European members of NATO have maintained their 
distinct status in relation to these two important organizations. Especially after the 
extensive enlargement of the EU in 2004, their status has appeared to be more anomalous 
and exceptional.  
In May 2004, the EU accepted ten states as new members (Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). 
Moreover, in January 2007 two more states (Bulgaria and Romania) concluded their 
accession to the EU. With its enlargement policy, the EU aimed at “widening the zone of 
stability, democracy and prosperity that the EU stands for.”81  The EU’s enlargement, 
notably in Eastern Europe, led in some cases to new disputes with neighbors of the new 
EU members. Some of these new EU members were not members of NATO. 
Consequently, the participation problem that arose after the 2004 enlargement of the EU 
led to disagreements about sharing classified NATO information with certain non-NATO 
members of the EU. Moreover, the dispute over the EU’s use of NATO assets and 
capabilities in EU-led operations has remained an unsolved problem between the 
organizations and non-EU NATO members. There are also some EU member states that 
reject the development of closer relations between the EU and NATO. The “scope 
problem” consists of the reluctance of some EU members to pursue certain topics in 
cooperation with NATO, because they would prefer to reserve these topics solely for the 
EU. As David Yost noted, this problem “stems in part from an inter-institutional 
competition rooted in overlapping missions and contrasting national ambitions for the 
two organizations.”82 Indeed, as Yost observes, the “scope problem … derives in large 
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part from the reluctance of a number of EU member states that are NATO Allies to 
expand the scope of NATO-EU cooperation beyond capabilities development discussions 
and operations under the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements.”83 These problems contribute to the 
feebleness of cooperation between these organizations. 
Despite the concern provoked by these significant problems in cooperation 
between the EU and NATO, NATO has transferred responsibility for some operations to 
the EU – notably in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Moreover, the EU has since 2003 also conducted its own EU-led ESDP 
missions outside of Europe for the first time. These operations have generally been 
civilian or police missions and have included training local stabilization units.  
The EU has searched for ways to strengthen its military capabilities and become a 
decisive military actor since the announcement of the European Security Strategy in 
December 2003. Therefore, at the European Council meeting on 17 June 2004, the EU 
determined some force development goals for 2010 beyond the 2003 Headline Goals in 
order to acquire more responsive military capabilities, at the same time as the launch of 
the European Defense Agency (EDA).84 The EU’s attempts include the creation of rapid 
reaction EU Battlegroups for the autonomous missions of the EU. A related goal is to 
increase cooperation among EU members to improve the European Union’s military 
capabilities. Consequently, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed in Lisbon on 13 December 
2007 by representatives of the 27 Member States. This Treaty offers more coherence and 
a framework for the EU to behave as a global actor with greater effectiveness. 
The most important problems of the EU include developing greater cohesion and 
conducting positive relations with the candidate states of the European Union in the 
enlargement process. The Cyprus dispute between Turkey and the EU, including the 
problem of the EU’s use of NATO assets and capabilities and the barriers to the 
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distribution of NATO classified information to EU states which are not members of 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace and which have not completed a security agreement with 
NATO in that framework, hinders cooperation between the EU and NATO. Besides, 
Turkey’s long accession process to EU membership makes the problems more 
complicated. These problems are affecting cooperation between the EU and NATO in a 
significant way, and hamper the development of the EU as an efficient supplier of 
security and stability.    
This chapter of the thesis considers recent ESDP developments and the impact of 
the disputes between Turkey and the EU on Cyprus and related problems in cooperation 
between the EU and NATO since the enlargement of the European Union in 2004. 
B. THE EU’S POLICY AFTER EU ENLARGEMENT AND ESDP 
DEVELOPMENT 
In order to avoid new threats to stability after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and to extend the economic and political benefits of the European Union to the 
eastern part of Europe, the EU accelerated its usual enlargement process. The 2004 
enlargement of the EU was the largest expansion of its history, from 15 members to 25 
members. The new states, namely Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia were generally less prosperous than the 
15 established members of the EU, and most of them had been influenced by the Soviet 
regime for decades and surrounded by problematic areas. Therefore, this round of 
enlargement was the most challenging ever undertaken by the EU. In January 2007, as 
noted previously, two more states became members of the European Union, namely 
Bulgaria and Romania. 
The effects of this enlargement are important for cooperation between the EU and 
NATO. At present, the EU contains 21 NATO members out of its 27 members. In other 
words, there are six non-NATO EU members, namely Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, 
Malta and Sweden. On the other hand, three European members of NATO from Europe 
are not members of the EU, namely Iceland, Norway and Turkey.85 Two of these states 
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have no diplomatic relations with each other— that is, Turkey and the Republic of 
Cyprus. This situation has caused several problems, not only between Turkey and the EU 
but also between the EU and NATO. 
The declaration of the European Security Strategy and the problems in 
cooperation about using NATO’s assets and capabilities in EU-led operations brought out 
the need for a sustainable and well-trained force to employ in the urgent situations. One 
of the serious attempts to achieve this goal was the creation of the European Defense 
Agency. As stated by Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis, experts with the Congressional 
Research Service, “in June 2004, EU leaders agreed to establish a European Defense 
Agency (EDA) devoted to improving European military capabilities and interoperability. 
A key focus of the EDA will be to help the EU’s 25 member states to stretch their scarce 
defense funds farther by increasing cooperation among members in the areas of weapons 
research, development, and procurement.”86 EDA was an important step for the EU, 
because it called for developing defense capabilities and maintaining cooperation inside 
the European Union. 
Headline Goal 2010 was a significant step beyond the 2003 Headline Goal of the 
ESDP. As noted by Konstantinos Vrettos, “the Headline Goal 2010 calls for a high level 
of responsiveness on the part of both headquarters and forces: five days for decision-
making, ten days for deployment.”87 This requirement of the European Union supported 
the battlegroup concept. The battlegroup was assumed to be "the minimum militarily 
effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone 
operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations.”88 To have this operational 
flexibility the EU needed highly-trained small units at a specific readiness level. As noted 
by Jolyon Howorth, battlegroups are “units of 1,500 troops prepared for combat in jungle, 
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desert or mountain conditions, deployable within 15 days and sustainable in the field for 
up to 30 days with potential extension to 120 days.”89  
In the most recent period of relations between NATO and the EU, the EU has 
played a more enterprising role and conducted more operations outside of Europe. 
Significant events such as the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 
have profoundly shaped the new security perceptions of the EU. As noted by Sally 
McNamara, “Transnational terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
and unstable or failed states present daunting challenges to the entire Euro-Atlantic 
community and require a long-term sustained response.”90 The EU has increased its 
participation in international peace-keeping operations. 
The EU took over NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) operation in Bosnia and 
renamed it operation Althea in December 2004. Operation Althea remains the biggest 
mission that the European Union has undertaken. A police mission to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to assist the police forces in coordination with the U.N. was launched 
in April 2005, after being delayed by logistical problems.  Moreover, “In June 2005,  
the EU and NATO agreed to coordinate efforts to airlift African Union peacekeepers to 
Sudan to help quell the ongoing violence in the Darfur region.” 91 However, the  
Darfur case illustrated the importance of improved cooperation between these 
organizations to avoid delays in meeting needs.92  
The EU has also conducted some civilian ESDP operations in the Middle East and 
Asia. As stated by Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis, “in July 2005, the EU began a civilian 
rule of law mission to help train about 800 Iraqi police, judges, and administrators. 
Training is taking place primarily outside of Iraq because of ongoing security 
concerns.”93 In addition to this, “in November 2005, the EU began deploying about 70 
monitors to the Rafah border crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt as part of 
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an Israeli-Palestinian agreement on security controls for Gaza following Israel’s 
withdrawal.”94 Furthermore, the EU led some civilian missions in Banda Aceh, 
Indonesia, in September 2005 in order to monitor the stability of the region; these 
missions lasted for approximately one year. “In June 2007, the EU launched a 200-strong 
police training mission in Afghanistan, partly in response to calls from NATO and the 
United States for assistance.”95  
The EU has also undertaken steps to advance security and stability by assisting 
and providing education to officials of non-EU countries in “countering weapons 
trafficking, organized crime, and corruption,”96 as with the border missions in Moldova 
and Ukraine in December 2005. As a recent example, “in January 2008, the EU approved 
deploying a 3,700-strong peacekeeping force to Chad aimed at protecting the thousands 
of Sudanese refugees there; this mission is expected to begin in March 2008.”97  
Debates over developing the military capacity and organization for the planning 
and conduct of these operations preoccupied members of the EU, especially after 
Operation EUFOR DR Congo, led by the EU in 2006. As Ion Dumitrascu has observed, 
“The [EU] Council has the overall responsibility for the conduct of EU-led crisis 
management operations…including the decision to take actions as well as to invite third 
countries.” 98 These responsibilities include, as noted by Dumitrascu, “the decision to 
launch and terminate the operation, [and] the review and adaptation of the mission.”99 
Therefore, the EU recognized the need for an operational headquarters, and in 2007 
established the EU Operations Centre in Brussels. The need for an EU centre to handle 
command and control in operations and coordination with other organizations became  
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apparent after some experiences with operations, as an alternative to using facilities 
provided by powerful members of the European Union or borrowing NATO’s 
capabilities. 100 
The Treaty of Lisbon, also known as the Reform Treaty, was signed in December 
2007. As noted by Christian Molling, “The key objectives of this treaty are to render the 
enlarged EU more effective and to increase its transparency and democratic 
legitimacy.”101 The Treaty of Lisbon was concluded in order to take account of the EU’s 
enlargement and to amend the current EU and EC treaties. 
The EU’s relations with the rest of the world are conducted by multiple actors 
inside the European Union. Coordinated and timely actions have been obstructed by these 
actors and inappropriate institutional structures. The Lisbon Treaty is important because 
of its attempts to solve the coherence and effectiveness problems. As noted by Sophia 
Dagand, “in an attempt to offer greater coherence, the Lisbon Treaty introduces some 
innovations aimed at rationalizing the EU’s institutional architecture.” 102 
As stated by Christian Molling, “The Lisbon Treaty affects the area of European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in two ways. First, general harmonization of the 
overall institutional framework should facilitate relations between the Council and the 
Commission with respect to crisis management issues. Second, several articles in the 
treaty are intended to strengthen Europe’s role in the world directly through the 
improvement of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its subordinated 
area of ESDP.”103 
The national policies of EU member states led to divisions inside the 
intergovernmental structure of the European Union in managing the common policy of 
the EU. As stated by Sophia Dagand, “The new treaty offers various opportunities for 
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greater policy coherence, effectiveness and visibility.”104 The treaty was designed to 
strengthen the European Union and make it more active and effective in international 
relations according to common European Union interests and ambitions.    
C.  PROBLEMS AND RECENT SITUATION OF NATO-EU RELATIONS 
The problems and disputes between the EU and NATO have increased, especially 
since the EU has pursued greater ambitions as an international actor. The emergence of 
the ESDP in 1998-1999, to the detriment of the WEU, changed the terms of reference for 
cooperation between the EU and NATO. According to the mutual needs of these two 
organizations in establishing security in the Euro-Atlantic region, their cooperation 
improved after the establishment of the ESDP and the Berlin Plus agreement on sharing 
NATO assets and capabilities in EU-led operations. However, the differentiated structure 
of these organizations, in conjunction with the enlargement process and new threat 
perceptions, created some problems after the launch of the ESDP in 1998-1999 and the 
major enlargement round of the EU in 2004. 
As noted by David Yost,  
Turkey has since 1963 refused to recognize the government of the 
Republic of Cyprus, which joined the EU in May 2004. Turkey has since 
1983 recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and has 
maintained that the Nicosia government has lacked the legal authority to 
represent Cyprus as a whole and to join the European Union. 105  
Therefore, Turkey has blocked formal contacts between the EU and NATO because of 
the recognition problem associated with Cyprus and the obstacles to sharing classified 
NATO information with states that are not members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
and that have not concluded security agreements with NATO in that framework. As noted 
by Yost, “The “participation problem” is shorthand for the conflict of principles that has 
since the 2004 enlargement of the EU limited effective cooperation between the members 
of NATO and the EU.”106 This conflict of principles has prevented formal common 
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planning and decision-making by these two organizations regarding important questions 
such as a potential crisis in Kosovo. Turkey’s concerns are understandable because the 
EU might decide to conduct an operation in an area of strategic interest to Turkey – such 
as Cyprus, the Aegean or the Balkans. 
In fact the EU disregarded its own accession rules for Cyprus, given that Cyprus 
is an island divided between two republics, namely the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus, that has many political, economic, and territorial 
problems to solve. By accepting the Republic of Cyprus as a member of the European 
Union, the EU brought about these problems in cooperation with NATO. Moreover, as 
noted by Sinan Ülgen, the chairman of the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy 
Studies (EDAM) in Turkey, “on the basis of the Community solidarity principle, the EU 
claims that Cyprus can no longer be left outside of the scope of this arrangement and 
refuses to engage in dialogue with NATO without all [EU] members sitting around the 
table.” 107 
It appears to be politically impossible in current circumstances for Turkey to drop 
its opposition to formal relations between the EU and NATO. The situation differs from 
that which prevailed before the 2004 enlargement of the EU. Some EU observers may 
interpret Turkey’s opposition to formal NATO-EU relations as a punishment to the EU 
for accepting the Republic of Cyprus, which is not recognized by Turkey, as a member 
while protracting the process for Turkey’s membership application for more than forty 
years. As noted by F. Stephen Larrabee, “frustration with and anger toward the EU is 
rising in Turkey. Support for Turkish membership in the EU has declined visibly over the 
last year. In 2004, 73 percent of the Turkish population supported Turkish membership; 
in 2006, that portion dropped to 54 percent.”108 Turkey and the EU nonetheless have 
many things to offer each other. Larrabee added that “Turkey wants to be a part of 
Europe’s defence policy. Its army is very capable, and is Europe’s largest. At the same 
time, Europe does not have sufficient troops to fulfill all its peacekeeping commitments, 
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and it is already relying on Turkish help for some of its operations.”109 The EU agreed at 
the Brussels summit in December 2004 to open negotiations for Turkey’s accession as a 
full member. 
The EU has opposed the involvement of non-EU states such as Turkey in the 
decision-making and management of its ESDP operations, even when they contribute 
forces to the operations. Turkey has no right to veto the EU’s autonomous operations 
because it is not a member of the EU. The admittance of the Republic of Cyprus to the 
EU without appropriate measures concerning the northern part of the island damaged 
relations between Turkey and the EU. Moreover, this relationship has become 
complicated. As noted by Larrabee, “under the Customs Union agreement signed with the 
EU in 1996, Turkey is obligated to open its ports and airports to Cypriot vessels and 
aircraft now that Cyprus is a full member of the EU. However, Turkey has refused to do 
so until the EU fulfills its promise to lift its trade embargo against Northern Cyprus.”110 
Ankara’s decision not to allow formal relations between NATO and the EU is a 
response to the uncooperative behavior of the EU and the Greek Cypriots. Consequently, 
Turkey’s behavior in upholding its principled policy regarding the participation problem 
presented by Cyprus and Malta has created an obstacle to cooperation between the EU 
and NATO on developing the relationship.  
Although the members of NATO and the EU are nearly the same (21 of the 27 EU 
members are also members of NATO), these two organizations have experienced several 
failures in cooperation and coordination. For instance, as mentioned by Tomas Valasek, 
“in 2005 they could not agree on who should support the African Union’s mission in 
Sudan, so each organization now runs its own operation there.”111 Both of these 
organizations are trying to increase their military capacity in order to act more efficiently 
in stabilization operations and in establishing Euro-Atlantic security. The EU has 
attempted to boost its military strength by forming the European Defence Agency and 
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articulating the 2010 Headline Goal. Valasek added, “the relative decline in Europe’s 
military capabilities is accelerating. EU member-states are not sending as many forces to 
Afghanistan as the operation commanders have requested, and they have failed to provide 
enough soldiers for the NATO response force.”112 
As noted by Yost, “The NATO-EU “participation problem” is thus rooted  
in part in the absence of a negotiated settlement in Cyprus.”113 In this situation, 
 the EU and NATO cannot officially meet and discuss joint future strategies. According 
to Sinan Ülgen,  
Turkey is therefore under increased pressure from its European allies to 
accept the new state of affairs and lift its veto on Cyprus. So far, Turkey 
has conditionally decided to lift its objection to the NATO-EU strategic 
dialogue with the EU-27, i.e., including Cyprus. The conditions require 
that the meetings be held non-officially (i.e., ‘informal’ dialogues) and in 
relation to urgent matters involving humanitarian concerns. As a result of 
this change of attitude, ‘informal’ NAC-PSC meetings were held on 
Darfur and on Kosovo.114  
Turkey intends to avoid weakening NATO because the strength of NATO is the strength 
of Turkey.   
Turkey and the EU had supported the Annan plan for uniting Cyprus. However, it 
was rejected by the Greek Cypriots in April 2004. Both parties, namely the Greek 
Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, are unwilling to compromise. As noted by Sinan 
Ülgen, “Cyprus (and Greece) are blocking Turkey’s security agreement and its 
participation in the European Defense Agency (even though Norway, another non-EU 
NATO member, is allowed to participate fully in EDA). The Cypriot government is 
intent on using Turkey’s negotiations process to steal concessions from Turkey  
regarding the political settlement on the island.”115 
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D.  CONCLUSION 
These ongoing disputes among members of both the EU and NATO are damaging 
the NATO-EU partnership. In order to establish more effective cooperation, both 
organizations have to find solutions to persuade and satisfy the parties that have created 
the disagreements. Otherwise, this situation will weaken not only the emerging ESDP but 





A.  INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of the European Union’s ambitions to play a greater role in the 
international arena in the 1990s after the disappearance of the Soviet Union led to the 
launch of the European Security and Defense Policy in 1998-1999. The establishment of 
the ESDP and the enlargement policy of the EU brought some problems in cooperation 
between the EU and NATO. The EU sought operational capability at first to conduct EU-
led missions in Europe, especially in the Balkan region, after the long conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia. But then, in accordance with its revised security strategies, the EU 
sent troops outside of Europe for peacekeeping operations on an autonomous basis and in 
cooperation with NATO. Both NATO and the EU have pursued enlargement policies and 
adapted their security strategies to meet new challenges in the wake of terrorist attacks 
and increased ethnic violence in critical regions. 
The European Union remained primarily an economic actor before the 
establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992. In 1998-1999, the European Union launched the European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP), established agreements inside and outside of the European Union — 
especially with NATO — and conducted many ESDP operations. As noted by Olli Rehn, 
the EU commissioner for enlargement, “20 missions have been launched, covering three 
continents, ranging from fully fledged military missions in the Balkans and Africa, to 
police missions [in] Iraq and Afghanistan, and rule of law missions in the Caucasus.”116 
These developments happened with the strong support of the major European powers and 
the United States. Washington has long favored a more active contribution from the 
European Union in establishing security and stability in Europe and neighboring regions.   
The EU developed its ESDP with many treaties and agreements in order to 
establish an effective decision-making structure and to promote coherence in the policy 
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of the European Union. However, the reluctance of several EU members to increase 
defense budgets is constraining the EU’s progress as an international actor helping to 
shape the security environment in a constructive fashion. The EU’s use of NATO assets 
and capabilities has nonetheless remained a partly unsolved problem between NATO and 
the EU. The EU has experienced an enormous change in its membership owing to the 
admittance of twelve states (ten in 2004, and two more in 2007) since it established the 
ESDP and associated institutions in 1998-1999. The two main difficulties in NATO-EU 
relations are the “participation problem” and the “scope problem,” and the former can be 
seen as an indirect consequence of the EU’s enlargement, as explained in Chapter IV.    
The EU’s ESDP decisions have directly affected Turkey’s security interests. This 
impact started with the exclusion of Turkey from the EU’s decision-making structure for 
the newly launched ESDP. This situation contrasted with the EU’s previous reliance on 
the institutions of the WEU, of which Turkey was an associate member. However, 
Turkey has participated in EU-led ESDP operations more than some EU member states. 
The EU demanded ready access to NATO assets and capabilities without accepting non-
EU European NATO members in the EU decision-making process. After long disputes 
Turkey accepted this agreement with “a formal guarantee that ESDP missions would not 
be deployed in the Aegean and that an EU force would not attack a NATO member 
state.”117 
A new problem came up on the agenda, however, after the accession of the 
Republic of Cyprus to the EU in the 2004 EU enlargement. Cyprus is a divided island, 
including both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. As Sühnaz Yılmaz has observed, 
“To the dismay of Brussels, the fortified Green Line dividing the two parts of Cyprus has 
now become an external EU border.”118 This situation stems from the fact that the EU 
violated its own rules in the accession of the Republic of Cyprus, because it is a state with 
border and recognition problems. Today’s situation threatens Turkey’s security interests 
in the Mediterranean and the Aegean. In the 2004 enlargement of the EU, Cyprus and 
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Malta gained full member status. The EU has pressed for the participation of these states 
in the formal meetings between NATO and the EU. However, Turkey opposes the 
distribution of NATO classified information to EU states which are not members of 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace and which have not completed a security agreement with 
NATO in that framework, such as Cyprus and Malta. In taking this position, Turkey is 
upholding the 14 March 2003 NATO-EU agreement on information security. 119 
The EU’s decisions about Turkey and its evolving ESDP project have not only 
affected Turkey’s interests but also the EU’s policies and EU cooperation with NATO in 
the years since the launch of the ESDP. First, the EU has lacked Turkey’s full support 
and contribution to EU-led operations. This shortcoming is significant because Turkey 
has the largest army in Europe. Second, the development of the ESDP and associated 
agreements on using NATO assets and capabilities (the “Berlin Plus” agreements) took 
more than 2 years. Third, since the Republic of Cyprus became an EU member, the EU 
has had to rely on informal meetings with NATO.  
Turkey’s candidate status for full membership in the EU has become a 
roundabout, and the seemingly endless process has consumed the enthusiasm and support 
of the Turkish people. 
B. TURKEY’S IMPORTANCE 
The significant role of Turkey in NATO-EU cooperation is becoming more 
obvious with the new security improvements and defense cooperation efforts of these 
organizations. Turkey’s strategic position between three continents is important for 
Europe because the EU’s future security plans unavoidably involve the region in which 
Turkey is located. Turkey has valuable regional influence with a wide range of states 
from Israel to Iran, because Turkey has a common history and culture with most of these 
states. As Baç noted, “Turkey is not the sole actor that could impact a settlement but its 
friendly ties and regional power status would greatly enhance the EU’s position in the 
Middle East and the Mediterranean.”120 In addition, Turkey is becoming aware of its 
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actual capability with its young and educated population. As Sinan Ülgen has observed, 
“With its growing political and economic influence and self confidence, Turkey has 
become more active in regional politics. Its relationship with the countries of the Middle 
East has improved considerably.”121 
Turkey remains a staunch member of NATO and has close relations with many 
European states. Proof of Turkey’s significance resides in the substantial contributions of 
Turkey to NATO and EU-led peace operations. Turkey makes these contributions despite 
the fact that it faces more threats than many NATO and EU member states. As stated by 
Larrabee, “Turkey is the only NATO member that currently faces a threat from ballistic 
missiles launched from the Middle East.”122 
Turkey is also important because of its military capabilities and its NATO-
compatible military assets. The need to increase the EU’s military capability is a serious 
issue on the EU’s ESDP agenda. Turkey sees itself as a European state that upholds 
European norms. Turkey has therefore participated in NATO and EU-led peace 
operations as a significant contributor. As Baç stated, “Turkey’s military capabilities will 
increasingly adapt to the EU’s new strategic objectives and enhance the EU’s military 
operability.”123 Turkey is an appropriate and capable partner for the EU to project power 
in neighboring regions. 
Turkey plays a stabilization and mediation role in its region, where some of the 
current threats to European security arise, such as “terrorism, illegal trafficking of drugs 
and people and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”124  
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The EU should increase its military spending in order to acquire stronger 
operational capabilities as an international actor. The differences in defense spending of 
the EU members have been summarized by Yves Boyer as follows: “Of the 27 EU 
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countries, only six — France, Germany, [the] UK, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands — 
accommodated [that is, accounted] for 82 % of all EU defence spending.”125 The level of 
will and commitment of the EU members will help to determine the effectiveness of the 
ESDP. As the NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, has stated, “The ESDP 
has meanwhile become an inseparable part of European integration.”126 Therefore, the 
EU has to pursue a coherent policy on every aspect of the ESDP.  
Both NATO and the EU have a differentiated future perspective. These 
organizations are becoming more interdependent, and stronger cooperation by NATO and 
the EU has become vitally necessary to meet the challenges of the future security 
environment.  
Some of the most important unresolved problems are related to the differing 
memberships of NATO and the EU. As Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has observed, “This leads 
to formal wrangles over security agreements, the exchange of information or the format 
of meetings.  We have been able to circumvent many of these hurdles through informal 
procedures.  But if those who put up these hurdles do not display more responsibility and 
flexibility, it will continue to place a heavy burden on NATO-EU relations.”127 However, 
these hurdles involve interactions between the state parties and according to their national 
(not their organizational) interests. The EU’s attitude towards Turkey, as it has been 
expressed since the launch of the ESDP in 1998-1999, should change from regarding it as 
a “step ally” to recognizing that it is a real ally. Moreover, the principle of protecting the 
rights of EU members, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, should be reconciled 
with the imperative of bringing about more productive security cooperation with Turkey. 
The European Union should take action to get the support of Turkey to develop 
stronger cooperation between NATO and the EU. First, the parties should work together 
to define a solution for the Cyprus dispute, on the island and in the international arena. 
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Turkey is prepared to support the unification of the island with the conditions specified in 
the 2004 Annan Plan, including equal rights for Turkish Cypriots. Second, as noted by 
Tomas Valasek, “The EU should offer Turkey an associate partnership in ESDP.”128 The 
EU would then receive more cooperation from Turkey. Third, the EU should accelerate 
Turkey’s accession to the EU as a full member. Turkey’s accession to the EU would put 
an end to many of the disputes and disagreements affecting cooperation between NATO 
and the EU. In a security perspective, Turkish membership in the EU would radically 
change the distance of the EU to the current threats. As noted by Çiğdem Nas, “EU 
policy towards Turkey is also extremely vital regarding the determination of the borders 
of the EU and the future identity of the EU.”129 The EU’s new neighbors would be 
Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. 
Turkey’s accession to the European Union would be a critical step for the EU in 
becoming an effective international actor. It would enhance trans-Atlantic cooperation 
enormously and promote constructive NATO-EU cooperation. However, this step would 
be a challenging one for the EU because Turkey’s accession is a multifaceted issue 





* It should be noted that the Turkish Republic does not recognize the Republic of 
Cyprus. References in this work to the “Republic of Cyprus” are made to conform to the 
academic literature but do not constitute recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by the 
author. 
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